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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. III
and followed it,20 apparently on the theory that a reenactment
necessarily is governed by the same exceptions as the previous
act. The rule, though perhaps not logically justifiable, is a rea-
sonable one. An error in translation certainly should not result
in the loss of any part of our civilian background.
J. M. S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INDICTMENT-NECESSITY OF NEGATIVING
ExcEPTION-Defendant was convicted for violation of a police jury
ordinance which prohibited the handling and distribution of in-
toxicating liquors, "otherwise than when prescribed by a licensed
physician as a medicine." By a motion in arrest of judgment, de-
fendant complained that the bill of information failed to negative
the exception in the enacting clause of the act defining the crime.
Held, under Article 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, those
facts which come by way of a proviso or exception in a statute
need not be negatived in the information, but must be urged by
way of defense. State v. White, 197 So. 645 (La. 1940).
The decisions of other jurisdictions dealing with the necessity
of negativing exceptions and provisos in criminal statutes reveal
definite lack of uniformity and certainty. Probably the greater
number have applied the "enacting clause" rule-that if the pro-
viso or exception appears in the enacting clause of the statute, it
must be negatived in the indictment or information.1 Difficulty
has been encountered in defining just what the enacting clause
is.
20. Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886); Straus v. New Orleans, 166
La. 1035, 118 So. 125 (1928); Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38
(1931); Morton Trust Co. v. American Salt Co., 149 Fed. 540 (E.D. La. 1906).
Straus v. New Orleans contains the following significant language: "The
French version of those articles of which the original translation is retained
in the Revised Civil Code are as authoritative as the corresponding articles
of the Revised Civil Code (166 La. at 1051, 118 So. at 131). Cf. Durnford v.
Clark's Estate, 3 La. 199 (1831).
What has been said in regard to the Civil Code is equally applicable to
the Code of Practice. The translation of the French has often been com-
mented upon. The French should control. Dugat v. Markham, 2 La. 29
(1830); Byrne v. Riddell, 4 La. Ann. 3 (1849); Cowand v. Pulley, 9 La. Ann.
12 (1854); State v. Judge of the Eighth District Court, 22 La. Ann. 581 (1870);
New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Teller, 113 La. 733, 37 So. 624 (1904). An excep-
tion (or contrary view) has been recognized where the French would con-
tradict other articles. Emerson v. Fox, 3 La. 178 (1831).
1. State v. Keen, 34 Me. 500 (1852); Commonwealth v. Byrnes, 126 Mass.
248 (1879); State v. McFadden, 151 Mo. App. 479, 132 S.W. 267 (1910); State v.
Reilly, 88 N.J. Law 104, 95 Atl. 1005 (1915); State v. Bloodworth, 94 N. C.
918 (1886); State v. Williamson, 22 Utah 248, 62 Pac. 1022 (1900).
The other rule most frequently enunciated is the "definition
of the crime" test-that the exceptions or provisos must be nega-
tived in the charge if the offense cannot be defined without so
doing.2 Under this test, the location of the proviso in the statute
is not controlling, although it may be relevant evidence on the
basic issue of materiality. The "definition of the crime" test is
probably preferable to the "enacting clause" test. Yet it is often
difficult to determine when an exception can be regarded as an
essential part of the description of the offense. For example,
under a common type of statute which makes the sale of alcoholic
beverages unlawful, except in certain cases specified therein,
some courts hold that the exception is not a part of the descrip-
tion of the offense,8 while others hold it necessary to the definition
of the crime.4
Noting the shortcomings of the above rules, the American
Law Institute, in its Code of Criminal Procedure, goes even
further than the most liberal established rule, and does not re-
quire the negativing of an exception or proviso in any case. Sec-
tion 175 provides: "No indictment or information for any offense
created or defined by statute shall be invalid or insufficient
merely for the reason that it fails to negative an exception, use,
or proviso contained in the statute creating or defining the
offense." This provision has been adopted in Michigan 5 and Ohio.6
The results reached in the Louisiana decisions on the subject
have been consistent, but the reasoning of the courts has not been.
In the earliest Louisiana case, State v. Lyons,7 defendant was con-
victed of selling intoxicating liquor to a slave. By a separate clause
of the act, persons giving liquor to slaves under their control by
a contract of hiring were exempted from its provisions. Holding
that it was unnecessary to regative the exception in the charge, the
court quoted Lord Mansfield as follows: "'It is a known distinc-
tion that what comes by way of proviso in a statute, must be
insisted on by way of defence by the party accused; but where
2. Ex parte Hornef, 154 Cal. 355, 97 Pac. 891 (1908); Smith v. People, 51
Colo. 270, 117 Pac. 612 (1911); State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 83 Kan.
389, 111 Pac. 474 (1910); Gibson v. State, 54 Md. 447 (1880); State v. DeGroat,
259 Mo. 364, 168 S.W. 702 (1914); Carpenter v. State, 106 Neb. 742, 184 N.W.
941 (1921); State v. Stevenson, 68 Vt. 529, 35 Atl. 470 (1896).
3. People v. Grabiec, 210 Mich. 559, 178 N.W. 55 (1920); State v. McLean,
157 Minn. 359, 196 N.W. 278 (1923).
4. People v. Barnes, 314 Ill. 140, 145 N.E. 391 (1924); State v. Pawlak, 103
W. Va. 555, 138 S.E. 120 (1927).
5. Mich. Pub. Act 175 of 1927, c. vii, § 48.
6. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1939) § 13437-9.
7. State v. Lyons, 3 La. Ann. 154 (1848).
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exceptions are in the enacting part of a law, it must appear in
the charge that the defendant does not fall within any of them.'"
In all subsequent cases where the exceptions were in a distinct
clause, our courts applied the "enacting clause" test.9 But where
the exceptions were in the same clause which defined the offense,
the courts disregarded the "enacting clause" test, and merely as-
serted that such exceptions must be urged by way of a defense
and need not be negatived in the indictment.10 It will be noted
that all these cases were decided before the adoption of the Code
of Criminal Procedure in 1928.
Article 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is substan-
tially an enactment of the first half of the quotation from Lord
Mansfield, but omits the latter part requiring exceptions in the
enacting part of a law to be negatived. Since the adoption of the
above provision, the Louisiana courts have completely cast aside
the "enacting clause" rule. In State v. Ramey," the defendant
was convicted for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In
the same sentence that denounced the offense, certain exceptions
were listed. The court declared, "such exceptions, although they
are named in the very first clause of the act defining the offense,
are named in an exception, excluding them from the operation of
the act. It is as much a proviso as if it appeared after the enact-
ing clause. Such being the case, it was not necessary to negative
it." In the recent case of State v. Bonner,12 defendant was con-
victed of violating a liquor statute which prohibited the sale of
spirituous beverages, "excepting for medicinal, scientific, or sacra-
mental purposes." The court decided that, under the express pro-
visions of Article 228, that which comes by way of a proviso or
exception in a statute must be urged by means of a defense, and
need not be negatived in the charge.
From the above survey, it will be noted that the conclusion
in the instant case is clearly in line with the result consistently
reached in Louisiana-that any exception or proviso, regardless
of its location in a statute, need not be negatived in the indict-
ment or information, but must be urged by means of a defense.
8. 3 La. Ann. at 155.
9. State v. Slower, 128 La. 460, 54 So. 942 (1911); State v. Coco, 152 La.
241, 92 So. 883 (1922); State v. Yokum, 155 La. 846, 99 So. 621 (1923); State
v. Hember, 157 La. 402, 102 So. 504 (1925); State v. Kimball, 162 La. 242, 110
So. 336 (1926).
10. State v. Barrow, 31 La. Ann. 691 (1879); State v. Cain, 106 La. 708,
31 So. 300 (1902).
11. 173 La. 478, 137 So. 859 (1931).
12. 193 La. 402, 190 So. 626 (1939).
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The similarity between our Article 228 and Section 175 of the
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure indicates
that we have adopted the most modern and liberal rule on the
subject-a rule providing an intelligible guide to the phrasing
of the indictment, and one which eliminates the obtuse distinc-
tions inherent in the earlier common law rules.
G. D. L.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-RIGHT TO DISCONTINUANCE OR NONSUIT
AFTER PLEA OF PRESCRIPTION-In a petitory action defendants,
without answering the merits of the petition, pleaded ownership
of the land by acquisitive prescription of ten years. At the con-
clusion of the evidence, but prior to- argument, plaintiffs moved
to discontinue the suit, or dismiss it as of nonsuit on paying costs.
The trial judge refused the motion and gave judgment in favor of
the defendants. Held, the trial judge should have ordered the
plaintiffs' suit discontinued without prejudice to the right of de-
fendant to have final judgment on the plea of prescription.' Rives
v. Starcke, 196 So. 657 (La. 1940).
Plaintiffs' motion to discontinue the suit was predicated upon
Article 4912 which reads: "The plaintiff may, in every stage of
the suit previous to judgment being rendered, discontinue the
suit on paying the costs." This appears to be unambiguous and
to give a plaintiff an absolute right to discontinue his suit. The
difficulty encountered in the application of the article has arisen
through the apparent recognition by the court in particular cases
of certain so-called exceptions3 to the rule enunciated by the
1. The supreme court said that "an affirmance of the judgment for the
defendants on their plea of prescription . . . would have the same effect if
the judge of the district court had ordered the plaintiffs' suit discontinued,
with reservation of the right of the defendants to have final judgment ren-
dered on their plea of prescription." Rives v. Starcke, 196 So. 657, 661 (La.
1940). Consequently, the judgment was affirmed.
2. La. Code of Practice of 1870.
3. In State v. Rost, 48 La. Ann. 455, 458, 19 So. 256, 257 (1896), the court
collected what were termed the exceptions to Article 491, La. Code of Practice
of 1870:
(1) In Crocker v. Turnstall, 6 Rob. 354 (La. 1884), it was held that after
the introduction of evidence, it was within the sound and legal discretion of
the judge as to the granting of a nonsuit. The existence of such discretion
was denied in State v. Rost, 48 La. Ann. 455, 19 So. 256 (1896), as explained
in Rive& v. Starcke, where it was said, ". . . the court would not have com-
manded Judge Rost to enter a voluntary nonsuit . . . if the court had con-
cluded that Judge Rost was . . . 'vested with judicial discretion in the
premises.'" (196 So. at 660).
It was also held in this case that Art. 491, La. Code of Practice of 1870,
